Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 6 (1984) 163-197
North-Holland

163

COMPANY GROUPS - THE EEC PROPOSAL FOR A NINTH
DIRECTIVE IN THE LIGHT OF THE LEGAL SITUATION IN THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
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I. Introduction
The Commission of the European Economic Community ("EEC") is currently preparing the final draft of a "Proposal for a Ninth Directive Based on
Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty on Links Between Undertakings and, in
particular, on Groups" [1]. If adopted as a proposed directive, the proposal will
be submitted for comments to the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Council and, finally, to the EEC Council [2]. The passage of the
proposed directive by the EEC Council is not expected before early 1985.
If passed by the EEC Council in its current version, the proposal for the
Ninth Directive will have far-reaching implications for the business activities
of company groups domiciled within the EEC, and those domiciled outside the
EEC with subsidiaries and/or affiliated companies within the EEC. This
article provides a critical analysis of the draft proposal of the Ninth Directive
("draft proposal"), its objectives and the legal background. Particular reference
is made to the present legal situation in certain EEC Member States, with
emphasis on the Federal Republic of Germany ("Germany"). The most
important provisions of the draft proposal are set forth in the appendix to this
article [3].

2. Background and development
Efforts to harmonize the EEC legislation on company law, based on Article
54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, have been underway in the EEC for more than ten
years [4]. Thus, a number of EEC measures that affect the activities of
multinational enterprises [5] should be taken into consideration when evaluating the possible effect of the draft proposal. Most of these measures have not
yet been enacted, however, apparently for two main reasons. First, the necess*
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ity for harmonization of laws on concerns [6] is not unanimously recognized
[7]. Second, there is little agreement as to the essential principles on which such
proposed legislation should be based.
The scope and meaning of harmonization, as set forth in Article 54(3)(g) of
the EEC Treaty, have been the focus of dispute from the outset. It can be
plausibly argued that Article 54(3)(g) must be interpreted on the basis of its
position in the chapter of the EEC Treaty dealing with the "right of establishment". A coordination of company laws would only be deemed permissible if
such harmonization is necessary for the removal of restrictions on freedom of
establishment. On the other hand, the EEC Commission, supported by the
EEC Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, actually interprets
Article 54(3)(g) in light of the other objectives of the EEC Treaty, such as
promoting a harmonious development of economic activities, increasing stability, accelerating increases in the standard of living, and encouraging closer
relations between the Member States. Harmonization thus may be extended
well beyond existing company laws. This sort of extensive interpretation of
harmonization of company laws may exceed, the proper bounds of lawmaking
and be explained only as legal expedience without proper authority [8]. Apart
from the varying social, economic and political backgrounds of each Member
State, one basic reason for this disagreement lies in the substantially different
approaches to the issue of related enterprises in the laws of the EEC Member
States.
2.1. German legislation on related enterprises
Of the ten Member States, Germany is the only country [9] which has
legislation on related enterprises and enterprise agreements. The Konzernrecht
("German concern law") was introduced in the 1965 revision of the German
stock corporation law, the Aktiengesetz ("AktG"). This law and the 1970
Working Report to the EEC Commission prepared by Professor Hans
Wilrdinger [10] have greatly influenced the draft proposal, which is primarily
based on the principles of German concern law. Thus, the draft proposal can
only be understood and analyzed in the light of the German concern law and
the experience gained from its application.
2.1.1. Objectives of the German concern law
The 1965 AktG contained the first provisions on "related enterprises" [11]
in German corporate legislation. The phenomenon of legally separate entities
which are actually dependent is not limited to Germany, but its prevalence in
Germany is remarkable. In 1965 it was estimated that approximately 70% of all
German stock corporations were related enterprises [12], and this proportion
has probably increased since that time.
Many of the existing arrangements among German companies amount to de
facto mergers. The most frequently used arrangements between related enter-
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prises are control agreements and profit transfer agreements. Accordingly. the
official comment on the 1965 Government draft of the AktG stated:
As a consequence of this structural change reflecting the economic trend towards concentration.
for a number of enterprises the legal form of a stock corporation only represents an external
organizational form. In such companies. the ties to the related enterprise have replaced the
corporate power structure among the bodies of a stock corporation. The decisions of such
company are made outside the competence structure of a stock corporation, partially based on
agreements with other enterprises, in a manner which is generally not subject to any legal
standards [131.

The provisions of the German concern law are not an effort to restrict
inter-company relations, nor are they antitrust legislation. Although the increasing trend toward further concentration has prompted investigations by
the German Government, business conglomeration has not met with legislative
disapproval and is, in fact, espoused by many who feel that concentration is
necessary for effective competition with large multinational concerns [14]. The
reporting requirements contained in the German concern law are designed to
convey a clear picture of the extensive inter-relationships existing between
German enterprises, and are a prerequisite for the protection of creditors and
minority shareholders of dependent German stock corporations [15].
2 1.2. Requirements of the German concern law
Under the German concern law, arrangements and all types of actual
influence between enterprises should be defined, regulated and made public for
the protection of outside shareholders and creditors of the German dependent
stock corporation. The regulations also apply to wholly-owned corporate
subsidiaries, with the exception of those provisions which expressly presuppose
the presence of outside shareholders of such subsidiaries.
2.1.21. Reporting of holdings. Section 20 of the AktG requires any "enterprise"
[16] with holdings in a German stock corporation amounting to 25% or more
to notify the latter in writing [17]. Further notification is required when the
enterprise acquires a majority of shares or votes [18], or when the interests
subsequently fall below these levels [19]. A German corporation receiving such
notification is required to publish its contents [20], and to refer to it in the
annual business report. Failure to comply with these reporting requirements
suspends the shareholders' rights of the non-complying enterprise [21].
According to the official comment on the Government draft of the AktG,
the purpose of these provisions is to inform creditors and the public of existing
holdings and of substantial acquisitions, and to ensure the enforceability of all
rules concerning related enterprises [22]. The rules differ depending whether
the related enterprises have entered into an enterprise agreement. Moreover,
the required consolidated statements [23] attempt to depict the true condition
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of the group as an economic entity and to prevent shifting of profits among
subsidiaries. The annual statements must include each German-domiciled
member of the group more than 507o of whose equity is held by the group
members [24].
2.1.2.2. Related enterprises. The phrase "related enterprises", as defined in
AktG section 15, is an umbrella term which includes enterprises held by a
majority and enterprises holding a majority of another enterprise, dependent
and dominating enterprises, combined enterprises, mutually participating enterprises and parties to enterprise agreements [25]. A corporation in which
another enterprise holds the majority is assumed to be dependent on the latter
("dependent corporation") [26]. A combine, or group of companies, is defined
as a single enterprise which dominates one or more dependent corporations
joined by the uniform direction of management (einheitliche Leitung) of the
dominating enterprise [27]. A uniform direction also exists in the case of a
control agreement and in the case of integrated enterprises [28]. The combine
may also exist between legally independent enterprises which are joined by a
uniform direction or management [29].
2.1.2.3. Enterprise agreements. "Enterprise agreements" fall into two categories. The first category comprises contracts in which a corporation, or a
partnership limited by shares, agrees to be managed by another enterprise
("control agreement"), or in which a corporation agrees to transfer all of its
profits to another enterprise, or to conduct its business for the account of the
latter ("agreement to transfer profits") [301. These two types of contracts are
usually combined in what is customarily referred to as an "Organschaftsvertrag". Agreements in the second category involve "profit pooling agreements", "agreements to transfer part of a profit", or "agreements to lease or
surrender a business", which entail a more limited degree of dependency [31].
The German concern law provides formal requirements for these agreements because of their substantial effect on a corporation's independence.
Enterprise agreements must be written [32], passed by a favorable shareholder
resolution adopted by a three-fourths majority of the obligor corporation [33],
and recorded in the respective commercial register [34]. In addition, control
agreements and agreements to transfer profits must be approved by the same
majority of shareholders of the obligee enterprise if the latter is a corporation
[35]. Finally, the law requires a full explanation to the shareholders of the
significance of pending enterprise agreements [36].
These enterprise agreements are not the legislature's creation. They have
evolved in practice, as a result of corporate inbreeding and of peculiarities of
German turnover and corporate income taxation [37]. Statutory recognition
appeared desirable, in view of the widespread use of enterprise agreements and
reliance on tax rulings and decisions concerning enterprise agreements. The
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AktG provisions clarify the legal effect of enterprise agreements by delineating
permissible limits for exercising influence over a controlled company, as well
as for establishing safeguards for creditors and outside shareholders (i.e.
minority investors not connected with the controlling group).
2.1.2.4. Consequencesof a given relationship.The most significant aspect of the
German concern law is the attempt to achieve a balance in a statutory scheme
between the conflicting interests of the dominating enterprise, on the one hand,
and outside shareholders and creditors of the dependent corporation, on the
other. First, if the related enterprises are parties to a control agreement, the
management of the dependent corporation must carry out any and all directives, however detrimental to the corporation, as long as these serve the purpose
of the dominating enterprise or an enterprise affiliated with it [38]. Absolute
control is, therefore, conditioned on a formal agreement sanctioning its exercise.
The board of management of the dependent corporation and the legal
representatives of the dominating enterprise are jointly and severally liable to
the dependent corporation and to its creditors for damages if they violate their
duty to operate as conscientious business managers [39]. In addition, the
members of both the board of management and the supervisory board of the
dependent corporation are liable for any violation of their duties [40].
The unrestricted discretion which a dominating enterprise enjoys under a
control agreement with a corporation is checked by the specific safeguards
protecting the creditors and shareholders of the dependent corporation. The
dominating enterprise must underwrite the losses and maintain the statutory
reserves of the dependent corporation in order to secure its creditors in the
event of the termination of the agreement [41]; to guarantee minimum dividend payments to outside shareholders [421; and to pay an indemnification
to shareholders who want to sell their shares to the dominating enterprise [43].
If the dependent corporation is the obligor under an agreement to transfer
profits, its creditors and outside shareholders essentially enjoy the same
protection [44]. Enterprise agreements in the second category [45], however, are
not required to provide for guaranteed dividends and appraisal rights to
outside shareholders [46].
Second, in the absence of any enterprise agreement ("de facto concern"),
the dominating enterprise must refrain from using its power or influence to
cause the dependent corporation to enter into transactions or to take or omit
measures, unless it specifically compensates the dependent corporation within
the same fiscal year for any disadvantage which the latter may incur [47]. The
failure to grant specific compensation renders the dominating enterprise liable
in tort [48]. The dominating enterprise and its legal representatives are personally accountable to the dependent corporation, its creditors, and even its
outside shareholders for damages, if no right to compensation has been
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granted, unless they prove that a conscientious manager of an independent
corporation would have acted in the same manner [49].
The dominating enterprise is not accountable for losses or for the liabilities
of the dependent corporation. To ensure an arm's-length compensation of the
dependent corporation, however, the managing board of a dependent corporation which is not a party to a control agreement is required to report all of its
dealings with the dominating enterprise every year ("report of dependence").
All transactions, measures taken and omissions induced by or serving the
interest of the dominating enterprise must be reported [50]. The auditors and.
thereafter, the supervisory board of the dependent corporation, must examine
the report of dependence. The members of both boards are liable for damages
resulting from neglect of their reporting duties [51]. The report of dependence
is not published. Even the shareholders' meeting receives only the ultimate
findings of the supervisory board of the dependent corporation. A shareholder
may ask a court for a separate examination if the supervisory board or the
auditors have raised objections to the report or if the board of management has
reported that disadvantages have been incurred without providing for the
necessary compensation [52].
2.1.2.5. Integration. The German concern law contains provisions on integration of corporations. These provisions permit treatment of a parent and a
subsidiary corporation as one economic entity without the requirement of a
merger [53]. Such integration is permissible when one corporation owns 95% or
more of the shares of another [54]. It is effected by resolutions from shareholders of both the parent company and the subsidiary, and by a recording in
the particular commercial register. The parent company's resolution must be
passed by a three-fourths majority [55]. The subsidiary maintains its separate
legal identity after the integration has been effected. For accounting purposes,
however, it is treated as a mere division of the parent corporation. Under this
scheme, the parent company is jointly liable for the obligations of the subsidiary [56] - a statutory piercing of the corporate veil.
2.1.3. Criticisms of the German concern law
The German concern law was drafted with deference to the interests of
dependent corporations. As one commentator has observed, the perspective is
"from below to above" [57]. Recognition of this sympathy for the perspective
of dependent corporations is essential to an understanding of the AktG [58].
The German concern law concentrates on the dependent corporation,
without making changes in the dominating enterprise [59]. Shareholder and
creditor protection is its major objective, although the problem of enterprise
groups, and specifically of multinational enterprises, reaches well beyond the
interests of such shareholders and creditors. The affected German industrial
associations strongly opposed the implementation of the concern law, and
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requested the entire deletion of the reporting requirements and the provisions
governing de facto concerns. In practice, however, the German concern law has
not proved unduly burdensome for related enterprises.
One reason for the ready adjustment to the new provisions may be that the
decisive terms are not always clearly defined, providing an enterprise which
dominates a dependent corporation de facto with a broad variety of means to
exercise its influence without violating its obligations. This vagueness has been
criticized and numerous proposals have been made to improve the provisions
in order to strengthen shareholders' rights. Some of these objections demonstrate a dominating enterprise's current scope of influence.
One objection is that because of its majority share in the dependent
corporation, the dominating enterprise can determine whether, at what time,
and under which conditions an enterprise agreement is concluded. Since the
majority holding of the dominating enterprise is decisive, it is argued that the
enterprise agreements are not freely negotiated; that the dependent corporation has already become dependent prior to the conclusion of such enterprise
agreements; that in most cases there are no arm's-length transactions; and that
the dominating enterprise is free to choose a weak phase in the economic
situation of the dependent corporation, in order to have a low going concern
value as the basis for a low settlement and compensation value for the
dividends to be paid to outside shareholders [60].
The procedure that outside shareholders must undergo to have the compensation and indemnity provisions of an enterprise agreement reviewed by
German courts is time-consuming and burdensome; for this reason, the process
has been criticized as insufficient protection of the interests of the outside
shareholders [61]. On the other hand, this has given related enterprises some
relief from constant exposure to court actions reviewing claims for small
amounts of compensation and indemnity. In addition, although in theory
complete indemnity must be granted to outside shareholders, judging the
adequacy of indemnity and having it reviewed by a court creates enormous
difficulties in practice [62].
Under AktG section 308, the dominating enterprise may, within the broad
scope of the principle of good business judgment, give valid directives to the
dependent corporation that, in the interest of the concern, obligate the dependent corporation to remove liquid reserves or personnel [63]. The provisions
which prevent hidden dividend distributions do not apply in this case [64]. A.
dominating enterprise is required to compensate every annual loss of the
dependent corporation. To the extent that this requirement is not already
achieved through transfer from freely disposable capital reserves of amounts
placed there during the life of the contract, the dominant enterprise will be
able to comply by using the dependent corporation's pre-contractual hidden
reserves. Use of such reserves has been criticized for depriving the dependent
corporation of its assets and book value [65].
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It is the general view that foreign dominating enterprises may also enter into
enterprise agreements [66]. The German concern law deals with corporations
dependent on foreign dominating enterprises only by way of exception, however [67].
German industry has raised a number of objections to the required report of
dependence for de facto concerns because the report is likely to require
disclosure of internal affairs which are subject to strict business confidentiality.
Whether such fears are justified is a controversial issue [68]; but it should be
noted that the report of dependence is strictly confidential and unavailable to
shareholders [69]. The confidentiality of this information is a major reason that
outside shareholders may find it difficult to learn of inter-company relationships and disadvantageous transactions by the dependent corporation. Generally, the provisions governing de facto concerns need reform. Certainly, reform
is needed in cases in which there is no enterprise agreement but the dominating
enterprise effectively controls management of the dependent corporation
through its ownership of a majority of shares. The most recent proposal for
reform in the German concern law appeared in the Report of the German
Commission on Enterprise Law [70]. At present, this proposal has little chance
of adoption since other parts of the AktG would have to be reformed
simultaneously [71].
2.2. French legal situation
In France, groups of companies are usually set up by means of share
participations [72]. Enterprise agreements, which do not result in tax privileges
under French tax law, are only used in rare cases [73]. Company groups are
widespread in France, but the form is not sufficiently regulated by French law.
"This is especially true for statutory law, [although] there is a certain body of
relevant case law" [74]. Repeated parliamentary attempts to enact rules for
groups of companies have been unsuccessful. "It seems that the French
Government, as well as the Parliament, aware of the hostility of business
towards such plans, would rather wait for the EEC to force the Member States
by a directive to enact statutory provisions on enterprise groups" [75].
French law does not define a "group". The law merely defines a shareholding in another company of 10-50% as "participation" and a holding of more
than 50% as "filiale" [76]. Groups with this structure must comply with certain
requirements. A company which holds the shares of another must inform its
shareholders and the public of this fact. Such restrictions can be circumvented
by circular participations although possibilities for such cross holdings are
somewhat limited.
The requirement under French law that a subsidiary should not be wholly
owned by another company is not difficult to meet within a group. Other
peculiarities regarding French regulation of groups of companies "concern the
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nationality of the subsidiary, its domicile, ... certain incompatibilities, the
problem of abusive management and of possible justification on the grounds of
the interest of the group as a whole, and the liability of the dominating
enterprise for the debts of its subsidiaries..." [77].
2.3. The English legal situation
The principles of English company law do not adequately address the
problems which corporate group activities present [78].
The general basis of English company law is the corporate entity doctrine.
"[Tihis doctrine applies whether or not the members of the company are
individuals or another company or companies" [79]. A consequence of the
entity doctrine is that "no constituent member of a group of companies [is]
liable for the debts or obligations of any other constituent member of the
group" [80]. In addition, directors are considered to owe loyalty to the
company and not to the individual shareholders [811.
English company law recognizes a strong doctrine of majority rule. The
Companies Act of 1948 provides that, under certain circumstances, the parent
company may make a direct takeover bid to minority shareholders to buy their
interest and that the minority shareholders in a subsidiary company may
compel the parent company to purchase their shares [82].
During the debates on the Companies Act of 1980, the Labour Party
spokesman proposed that a parent company be liable for debts of its insolvent
or defaulting subsidiary unless the subsidiary's creditors have been specifically
notified that such liability has been excluded [83]. As one commentator has
noted:
The Government rejected these proposals, primarily ... because it was uncertain as to their impact
on the willingness of parent companies to become involved in high risk ventures: a point which, at
least theoretically, has much validity, as the result of the proposals would be to put all the parent's
resources at risk with respect to the trading activities of its subsidiaries [84].

2 4. The Belgian legal situation
The Belgian law does not refer to groups of companies, and each company
is regarded as an independent entity. There is little statutory law on groups of
companies in Belgium, but problems have been handled smoothly and efficiently by the Belgian Banking Commission [85].
The basic objectives of Belgian legislation on related enterprises are: "[first,
to prevent] the general corporate law from becoming meaningless in situations
where one corporation controls another [and] second, to acknowledge the
existence and function of enterprise groups, and to develop an adequate special
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set of rules for them" [86]. The 1979-80 proposal for company law reform,
which defined "controlling corporations" and introduced other provisions
concerning controlling corporations, has not yet led to actual results. The
Banking Commission has dealt with enterprise groups extensively, even though
the legislature has chosen to ignore their existence. The Banking Commission,
a legal entity in its own right, has specific powers to supervise holding
companies by obtaining necessary information. Based on the principle of equal
treatment of all shareholders, the Banking Commission has developed rules for
protection of shareholders in cases of takeover transactions and transfers of
controlling interests. The policy of extending bankruptcy to the "master of
affairs" is aimed at protecting creditors [87]. Although the latter has only been
applied by Belgian courts to individual controlling companies, it is argued in
several pending cases that this doctrine should be extended to controlling
enterprises as well [88].
2.5. Structure of concerns within the EEC
In addition to related enterprises on the national level of each Member
State, there is a range of types of company groups within the EEC. The
horizontal structure of groups of companies is a European phenomenon. This
contrasts with the vertical structure, headquartering a centralized group composed of companies from several countries solely within one industrialized
country, which is particularly prevalent in the United States and Japan.
Almost all horizontal groups and combines were organized in the late 1950s
and 1960s, in anticipation of expected progress with regard to modernization
of European laws or with a view to a possible future uniform European
corporation [89]. These horizontal groups, most of which are bi-national, have
relied upon the traditional instruments of the respective national company and
tax laws of EEC Member States, utilizing a variety of special contractual
arrangements. Rather than setting up their own subsidiaries in other EEC
countries, European companies regarded the establishment of bilateral ties
with groups in other Member States as an adequate response to the future
demands of the developing European market. More recently, however, these
bi-national groups of companies within the EEC have begun to lose their
bi-national character or separated, although economic integration continues to
make progress within the Common Market [90].
The process of economic concentration, the establishment of a net of
vertically integrated companies in different countries, has advanced rapidly.
Except for the banking and insurance industries, which have retained their
predominantly national characters, progress has been made toward a European
branch structure in many areas. Such market penetration throughout the EEC
has led to an increase in vertical groups of companies which must deal with a
patchwork of differing legal structures [91]. From the point of view of the EEC
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Commission, this may have been the major impetus behind the drafting of a
proposal on organizational law of concerns.

3. Development and analysis of the draft proposal
3.1. Events leading to the draft proposal
Based on the 1970 Working Report of Professor Hans Wtirdinger, special
counsel to the EEC Commission [921, in 1974 the EEC Commission issued Part
I [93] and in 1975, Part II [94], of a pre-draft for a Ninth Directive concerning
legislation on groups of companies.
Part I of the pre-draft primarily contained amendments to EEC directives
proposed or already enacted, as well as general definitions and rules pertaining
to groups of companies. Part II concerned the actual statutes for groups of
companies. The general distinction, derived from the German concern law,
between de facto concerns and company groups formed under enterprise
agreements was incorporated into the proposed statutes. Each national legislature could either accept this distinction or vote for the more stringent concept
of a European stock corporation law [95].
The Member States did not comment officially on this pre-draft. A number
of comments were made by interest groups within the EEC, however. The
business associations of each Member State except Germany disputed the
notion and the necessity of harmonized legislation on groups of companies
[961. Only the Federal Association of German Industries ("BDI") accepted the
need for the pre-draft, although it criticized many substantive details of the
provisions [97]. The subsequent legal discussion in Germany did not reveal a
significantly different point of view [981.
As a result of critical comments, the EEC Commission revised the pre-draft
entirely, producing a draft proposal in 1980. All along the draft proposal has
been regarded by the EEC Commission as an internal working paper. This
working paper has nonetheless been the basis of a hearing of the Association of
Industries within the European Community ("UNICE") [99]. The EEC Commission postponed the final passage date for its draft proposal from October
1981.
3.2. Analysis of the draft proposal
Comments available on the proposal thus far include only the 1981 UNICE
comment and a brief summary by the BDI [100]. All other comments refer to
the 1974-75 pre-draft of the EEC Commission because the draft proposal
itself has not been officially distributed. More detailed discussion can be
expected when the final proposal of the EEC Commission is available [101].
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The draft proposal is modelled on the German concern law and is designed
to provide basic rules for group structures. The proposal's analysis focuses on
the basic principles for group structures, including (1) the necessity for a legal
framework for groups, (2) the concept of dependency among companies, (3)
the specific reporting and auditing requirements envisioned for inter-company
relations, (4) the protection of the dependent enterprise and the obligation of
the dominating enterprise, and (5) the form of enterprise agreements establishing the legal basis of groups.
3.2.1. Impediments to harmonization laws
The preamble lists a number of "assumptions" which constitute the reasons
for harmonized legislation on groups of companies among the Member States.
As the official Explanatory Notes to the draft proposal ("Notes") state, the
principal objective of legislation on groups of companies is "harmonization" of
European law [102].
Whether or not the Ninth Directive agenda reflects a genuine need in the
EEC market, the fate of harmonized European law on groups of companies
will ultimately be decided by non-legal considerations. Political and social
factors will be decisive. Within each Member State, criticism of the capitalist
structure and of particular national and foreign policy preferences will frame
the debate. Harmonized legislation on groups of companies must accommodate the range of political and social constraints among the Member States.
National revision of company laws is often a hard-fought and divisive process.
Altering co-determination legislation may be equally difficult, depending upon
the influence exercised by unions in the various Member States [103].
Given its concern law, Germany is unlikely to question seriously the
necessity for harmonized EEC legislation on groups of companies. Several
issues may be troublesome in Germany: for instance, to what extent and by
what means the rights of outside shareholders and creditors of the dependent
corporation are strengthened under harmonized EEC legislation; to what
extent co-determination rights are maintained or extended; and, above all, to
what extent the formation of groups of companies is supported or restricted by
requiring certain legal structures. The Ninth Directive thus may stir considerable debate in Germany. Moreover, other Member States are even less likely to
recognize the necessity for harmonized legislation on groups of companies
[104].
3.2.2. Defining company domination
The draft proposal seeks to create a legal scheme for the relation between
parent companies and their dependent "EEC subsidiary companies". "Company" is defined as the legal form which a publicly held stock corporation
takes in each of the Member States [105]. Upon examining the entire document, it becomes clear that the draft proposal would apply only if an
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enterprise group has such a company as a "dependent corporation" in one of
the Member States. The draft proposal defines a "dependent" company as
"one over which the dominant undertaking" (i.e. the parent company) "is
able, directly or indirectly, to exercise a dominant influence" [106]. By defining
"dependence" as the converse of "domination", the drafters make the concept
of "domination", which is fundamental to the German concern law, an
essential feature of the draft proposal. Contrary to the view expressed in the
Notes to the draft proposal, this concept of domination is not found in the
laws of most of the other Member States. It should be noted that the absence
of clear definitions of "direct domination" and of "indirect domination" will
compound the problems of implementing this innovative legislation [107].
Article 3 provides for application of the draft proposal in cases of joint
domination by two or more enterprises. It is unclear whether a company can
be dependent on two or more enterprises under the laws of the Member States
and there is no national legislation on this issue. Because possible solutions
have not been discussed sufficiently, all comments made on the draft proposal
recommend the deletion of this provision [108].
3.2.3. Notification and disclosureof company acquisition
The draft proposal imposes requirements of notification and disclosure
upon all parent companies based upon their shareholdings in the dependent
corporation. A dependent corporation must be notified of a shareholding of
10% and/or the subsequent acquisition of additional 5% blocks of its shares
[1091. Until such notification is made, no shareholder rights may be exercised.
The shareholding notified must be recorded in the annual records of the
dependent corporation and, if specific percentage rates are reached, disclosed
according to national laws.
In principle, such a notification -requirement is similar to the German
concern law. But the German law requires notification only for the acquisition
of 25% or more and subsequent notification upon acquisition of 50% or more
of the outstanding shares. Thus, a notification is required if the shares acquired
give the buyer certain rights and influence in the company. If the objectives of
the draft proposal are (1) to set up a legal framework for groups of companies,
and (2) to protect minority shareholders, it is uncertain how a notification
requirement set at increments of 10% acquisition will directly serve such
purposes [110].
3.2.4. Additional obligations
Apart from the notification of acquisition discussed above, the draft proposal establishes two additional obligations, application of which would depend on whether the relation of dependence exists de facto or is based on an
enterprise agreement.
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3.2.4.1. De facto domination. Section 4 of the draft proposal, which consists of
Articles 7-12, outlines the extent of influence which one or more dominant
enterprises may exercise on a dependent corporation without an enterprise
agreement. These provisions are designed to protect minority shareholders.
creditors and employees of a dependent corporation from the exercise of
dominant influence. This protection of particular interest groups raises a
number of questions. For instance, UNICE argues that the protection of
employees' interests should not be considered as one of the objectives of
legislation on groups of companies [111], because employees' interests are
protected by existing labor legislation, such as the German co-determination
law. Similarly, the interests of creditors are adequately protected by EEC
legislation, such as the Second Company Law Directive, the proposed Bankruptcy Convention, and the Fourth Company Law Directive [112]. This leads
to the question whether the protection of creditors' interests should be the
subject of company group laws. In short, critics can contend that several
aspects of the draft proposal are redundant [113].
Article 7 of the draft proposal is the basic rule governing liability of a
dominant enterprise. It provides that a dependent corporation not subject to
an enterprise agreement must be managed in a way that assures its own
greatest advantage; it provides that the dominant enterprise and each of the
members of its administrative body shall be liable when the dominant enterprise exercises influence over management that results in damage to the
dependent corporation. In principle, Article 7, paragraph 1, is comparable to
AktG section 317(1). But the language of the two provisions differs. Under the
German provision, when the dominating enterprise "causes" a dependent
corporation to enter into disadvantageous transactions it must reimburse the
dependent corporation for any damages resulting therefrom. Article 7, paragraph 1, of the draft refers to "influence" of a dominant enterprise resulting in
"damages" to the "interests of the dependent corporation". The meaning of
"influence" and "damages" for which the dominating enterprise may be liable
needs clarification because the lack of precise definition is likely to cause legal
and economic uncertainty, making necessary decisions within the group extremely difficult.
The directors' liability established in Article 7, paragraph 2, should not be
governed by laws on groups of companies. This recommendation has already
been issued by the EEC Commission in Article 14 of the proposed Fifth
Directive [114]. Moreover, Article 7, paragraph 2(a), does not specify what
criteria must be met in order to relieve a member within the dominating
enterprise's management of any liability. Article 7, paragraph 2(b), which
provides for the liability of members of the management board of the dependent corporation, assumes that such members must preserve the interests of the
dependent corporation and that, in order to avoid any liability, they must
refuse to follow the instructions of the dominating enterprise.
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Under Article 8 of the draft proposal, the dependent corporation is required
to disclose "significant measures" that were undertaken or considered and
rejected by the dependent corporation on the "initiative" of the dominating
enterprise; this disclosure is intended to safeguard the dependent corporation's
interests and is to be made in a special annual report ("dependence report").
This article goes beyond the requirements of the German concern law. which
requires that a dependence report be available for inspection by auditors and
the supervisory board, but which does not stipulate that it be published or
distributed to shareholders [115]. Although it is not quite clear how detailed
the Article 8 dependence report must be, the information it contains could
prejudice the confidential character of certain information since a broad
interpretation of the draft proposal would require publication of information
damaging to the competitive position of the dominating enterprise. In addition,
under the German concern law, the dominating enterprise is not obliged to
reveal its actions and compensatory advantages are considered in determining
the injury sustained by the dependent corporation. Thus, it appears that
Article 8 goes beyond both the goals of providing sufficient information
regarding infringements of Article 7 and of ensuring that interested parties
receive relevant information.
Article 9 provides the further safeguard that, upon request of a shareholder,
a creditor or the employees' representative of the dependent corporation, a
court or other competent authority may appoint special auditors for the
dependence report. Under the German concern law, on the other hand, a
shareholder may only apply for court appointment of a special auditor if the
auditor, the supervisory board or management has averred in the dependence
report that transactions with the dominant de facto enterprise are, in fact,
detrimental to the dependent corporation. Because Article 9 of the draft
proposal goes beyond the German provision, it has been criticized by UNICE
and BDI [116].
The rights stipulated in Article 9 should not be granted to employees and
creditors because these parties have other means of obtaining the required
information [117]. The imprecise language of Article 9, paragraph 1, raises the
questions of when facts "give rise to the presumption" and when a dominating
enterprise has "instigated" measures sufficiently detrimental to a dependent
corporation to merit judicial investigation. Abuse of rights under Article 9 is
not unlikely, since the financial burden of investigation is automatically borne
by the dependent corporation alone. Significantly, the draft proposal fails to
provide standards to be applied by auditors and courts in the evaluation of
special reports. This deficiency may well result in conflicting interpretations
and consequent legal uncertainty among the Member States.
Article 10 grants courts (or other competent authorities) substantial remedial powers where influence of the de facto dominating enterprise upon
management of the dependent corporation has damaged the dependent corpo-
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ration. These measures may include suspension of board members of the
dependent corporation, prohibition of further performance of damaging contracts, revocation of damaging measures, and a judicial decree that the
dominating enterprise must offer to purchase the shares of the minority
shareholders. In contrast, compensation under German concern law is subject
to stricter judicial scrutiny and less potent remedies. For this reason, UNICE
and BDI demanded that Article 10 remedies, other than compensation for
damages by the dominating enterprise, be strickeii [118].
Article 11 provides that proceedings under Article 7 may be brought by the
dependent corporation, by any shareholder acting on its behalf, or by creditors
unable to obtain satisfaction from the company. As outlined above, rights
according to Article 7 should only be granted to shareholders but not to
creditors, since they are already protected by various remedies. Furthermore,
the claims referred to in Article 11 only concern claims for damages. National
laws provide that actions for damages to the dependent corporation may only
be brought by the dependent corporation itself or that, under certain circumstances, a derivative right of action be granted to shareholders [119).
3.2.4.2. Enterprise agreements. Articles 13-32 of the draft proposal, on dependent corporations as parties to enterprise agreements, impose a different set of
obligations. They regulate instances in which management of a dependent
corporation defers to management of another enterprise under a written
agreement. As outlined above, the group structure of enterprise agreements is
familiar in Germany [120]. Related enterprises in other EEC Member States,
however, should not be compelled to adopt the particular forms of this group
structure since these forms are unlikely to be compatible with the manner of
operation of most groups.
When an enterprise agreement is initiated according to these provisions, the
minority shareholders of the dependent corporation must be offered the choice
of a cash repurchase of their shares, stock of the parent company, debentures,
or "annual equalization payments" based upon the estimated average earnings
per share. When the dominating enterprise is a non-EEC company, it may only
offer a cash option. According to the Notes, the offer of securities is not
permitted in such cases in order to avoid the legal and practical difficulties of
monitoring the terms of exchange [121].
Articles 17 and 22 provide for preparation of an independent report on the
appropriateness of the compensation offered to shareholders who apply for an
examination of such findings. These provisions, which have no equivalent in
the German concern law, could, in certain circumstances, lead to a three-level
indemnification procedure which would include examination by courts with
new experts reviewing the situation on each level. German experience indicates
that examination of compensation offers by the courts often takes five years or
longer. This would impose an extended period of uncertainty for which the
dominating enterprise would invariably bear the costs [122].
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Once concluded, an enterprise agreement requires that the dominating
enterprise exercise its managerial powers with the "care of a conscientious
director and in the group interest" [123]. Negligent failure to adhere to this
standard results in liability, but only for the dominating enterprise and not for
its individual directors [124]. In addition, the dominating enterprise is liable for
obligations of the dependent corporation arising prior to or during the contractual period, unless it can prove that the dependent company's failure to
fulfill its obligations is attributable to circumstances which are not the result of
any "influence" that it has exercised or failed to exercise [125]. If the enterprise
agreement expires, the dominating enterprise must compensate the dependent
corporation for any "diminution in.. .value" which it has sustained during the
lifetime of the contract, unless it can prove that the diminution was not the
result of its influence [126].
According to Article 24, paragraph 2, any direction may be blocked if the
directed measure is subject to the approval of a supervisory board on which
employees of the dependent corporation are represented, provided that their
interests are not safeguarded in an equivalent manner by the dominating
enterprise.
Article 24, paragraph 2, and other articles of the draft proposal presuppose
that the two-tier board system is introduced in all Member States. Since several
Member States oppose the compulsory introduction of this system, it appears
to be inappropriate to base provisions on such an assumption [127]. Moreover.
the application of Article 24, paragraph 2, would cause difficulties since it
would require assessment of whether one form of employee involvement is
equivalent to another. This sort of assessment is difficult to make because of
the profound differences that exist in this area in both Member States and in
non-EEC countries. If the forms of employee involvement are not equivalent.
measures of the dominating enterprise could be blocked by the supervisory
board of the dependent corporation, even though the measures are beneficial
to the group [128].
Article 26, which provides for the liability of a dominating enterprise that
has negligently failed to exercise management powers appropriately, is comparable to the provision contained in the German law. In order to prevent any
abuse of rights to which the outside shareholders are entitled, however, the
German concern law also imposes the risk of costs upon the claiming shareholder if his or her claim for payments to the dependent corporation is'not
successful. Article 26, paragraph 2, provides that, in any case, the dependent
corporation will have to bear all costs. This would permit an abuse of rights.
Article 28, which requires approved annual accounts, reports, and audit
reports, only governs dominating enterprises within the EEC. As the Notes
point out, the EEC has no jurisdiction to impose Article 28 on enterprises
formed in non-Member countries.
Articles 29 and 30 are obviously intended to protect the interests of
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creditors of dependent corporations, as well as those of the dependent corporations themselves. In AktG section 302, the German concern law provides that
the dominating enterprise must assure that the worth of the dependent
corporation is maintained if the enterprise agreement is terminated. Article 30
goes far beyond this German compensation provision. Apparently, the creditors' interests which are to be protected cannot exceed the worth of the
dependent corporation. Since, according to Article 30, any losses of the
dependent corporation are compensated, any additional protection of the
creditors' interests appears unnecessary [129].

4. Summary
The draft proposal is inspired by the German concern law, with its stress
upon the concept of "domination". As demonstrated, the German concern law
distinguishes between situations in which such domination is exercised on the
basis of an enterprise agreement and that which exists by de facto arrangement. Depending upon which instrument of domination is used, German
concern law imposes different requirements on the related enterprises in order
to achieve its central objectives: the protection of the dependent corporation's
outside shareholders and of creditors. The draft proposal has generally adopted
this concept of domination on either a factual or a contractual basis, but it
imposes requirements on the related enterprises which, in essential parts,
extend far beyond the German concern law. Apart from Germany, the
Member States have rejected the implementation of laws on groups of companies. In view of this and the fact that the draft proposal substantially exceeds
the requirements imposed on related enterprises by the German concern law,
one may draw several conclusions.
First, the necessity of harmonized EEC legislation on groups of companies
will not be recognized unanimously. In particular, political and social constraints will remain an intractable obstacle toward Ninth Directive adoption.
Second, the draft proposal adopts the German concept of domination based
upon either enterprise agreements or a de facto influence. This concept may
reflect particular circumstances in Germany, but it does not appear to account
for the different situations of other Member States in which enterprise agreements are rarely used and in which the number and structure of corporations
differ significantly from the situation in Germany. As indicated by the UNICE
comment, the other Member States are expected to oppose the introduction of
the German concern law as European law since the draft proposal exceeds the
German concern law; therefore, the implications of the draft proposal will be
much more restrictive for international business activities.
Third, the percentage rates underlying the general notification requirements
according to Section 3 of the draft proposal are too low. Generally, a holding
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of 5-10% in a corporation does not result in a dominating position for the
holding company.
Fourth, the provisions governing the dependence report in Article 8 of the
draft proposal subject the dominating enterprise to stringent publication and
disclosure requirements which do not appear to be justified by the objectives of
the draft proposal and which are more likely to restrict business activities than
to protect the interests of outside shareholders.
Fifth, the sanctions in Article 10 of the draft proposal go far beyond the
corresponding provisions of the German concern law. Article 10 will generally
provide for the basis of official intervention in the internal structure of related
enterprises and thus needlessly violate the principles of a free economy.
Moreover, the rights of employees are not and should not be subject to laws on
groups of companies.
Sixth, the compensation claim of the dependent corporation under Article
30 of the draft proposal does not fit into the concept of domination by
enterprise agreement and exceeds the provisions in the German concern law.
Seventh, the draft proposal is not clear as to the implications for non-EEC
dominating enterprises. As does the German concern law, the draft proposal
leaves unanswered, for example, questions of which laws govern the validity of
an enterprise agreement, which courts are competent to enforce rights under
the draft proposal, and how certain rights, such as the obligation to assume
losses of the dependent corporation, can be enforced against the non-EEC
dominating enterprises.
As the draft proposal is considered merely a working paper, it is expected
that the final proposal by the full EEC Commission may already reflect some
of the objections raised here. The reactions to the final proposal will demonstrate whether and to what extent a directive on company groups will be
accepted by the Member States.
Appendix
The pertinent provisions of the draft proposal read:
Article 2
1. For the purpose of this Directive, a dependent undertaking is one over
which another undertaking, referred to as the dominant undertaking, is
able, directly or indirectly, to exercise a dominant influence.
2. An undertaking shall be presumed to be dependent on another undertaking
where the other undertaking directly or indirectly:
(a) holds the major part of the undertaking's subscribed capital, or
(b) controls a majority of the voting rights attaching to the shares in the
undertaking, or
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(c) is in a position to appoint at least half of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of the undertaking, provided
that these members have the majority of the voting rights.
3. Holdings of an undertaking dependent on the dominant undertaking and
holdings of other persons acting in their own names but on behalf of the
dominant undertaking or of an undertaking dependent on it shall be
regarded as forming part of the holding of the dominant undertaking within
the meaning of paragraphs 2(a) and (b).
Article 3
1. Where, by virtue of an agreement or otherwise, two or more undertakings
are in a position to jointly exercise directly or indirectly a dominant
influence over another undertaking, each of the first mentioned undertakings shall be considered to be a dominant undertaking and the latter
undertaking to be a dependent undertaking.
2. It shall be presumed that two or more undertakings are in a position to
jointly exercise a dominant influence over another undertaking where they
jointly satisfy one of the conditions laid down in Article 2(2)(a)-(c) and
where either the majority of their shares are held by the same person or
more than half of their administrative, management or supervisory bodies
are made up of the same persons.
3. Article 2(3) shall apply.
Article 4
1. Where a natural or legal person acquires directly or indirectly more than
10% of the subscribed capital of a company, it shall notify the total amount
of the holding and the voting rights attaching thereto to the company in
writing within two weeks from the date of acquisition of those shares which
increased the holding to more than 10%. Each further acquisition of shares
of the company which raises the holding beyond successive steps of 5% shall
be notified in the same way. Like notification shall be made each time the
holding falls below the percentage of 10% or below each step of 5%.
2. Shares held by persons in their own names but on behalf of another person
shall be regarded as shares belonging to the latter. Where such latter person
is an undertaking, shares held by a person dependent on such undertaking
or held by other persons in their own names but on behalf of a dependent
undertaking shall also be regarded as shares belonging to the former
undertaking.
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Article 5
1. A shareholder may not exercise the rights attaching to shares which are to
be notified in accordance with Article 4(1) until such notification is made.
2. Where, contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, voting rights have been
exercised at the general meeting and the result of the vote has been
influenced thereby, the resolution adopted as a result shall be void or may
be declared void. The rights of third parties acquired in good faith shall not
be affected thereby. An action to have the resolution found or declared void
may be brought by any shareholder who contests the entitlement of another
shareholder to take part in the vote.
3. Such action shall be brought within a time limit which shall be fixed by
Member States at not less than three months and not more than one year
from the date on which the applicant became aware or ought to have
become aware of the notifiable holding. Article 46 of Directive so* of
*so ' shall apply.

4. The company may require the repayment of dividends to which, by virtue of
paragraph 1, a shareholder was not entitled.
5. Member States shall also provide for appropriate penalties where notification is not made in accordance with Article 4(1).
Article 6
1. Holdings notified pursuant to Article 4(1) shall be mentioned by the
company receiving such notification in the notes to its annual accounts.
Notifications made for the first time, and the notification of subsequent
modifications bringing the amount of a holding above or below the threshold
levels of 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 90% of the company's capital, shall
moreover be disclosed forthwith by the company in the manner prescribed
by the law of each Member State in accordance with Article 3 of Directive
68/151/EEC. The name of the shareholder making such notification, the
notified amount of the holding and voting rights attaching thereto shall be
indicated in the notes on the annual accounts and in the publication.
2. Member States may waive mention of the notification in the notes on the
annual accounts and, where appropriate, its publication, where such mention or publication would place the shareholder concerned or the company
at a significant disadvantage. The management body or person who took
such decision shall record it in the notes to the annual accounts.

Proposal for a fifth Directive on the structure of soci&s anonymes: Supplement 10/72 to the
Bulletin of the European Communities.
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Article 7
1. An undertaking which dominates a company within the meaning of Article
2 or 3 of this Directive, and which influences directly or indirectly the
management of the company, shall be liable to the company for any
damage resulting from that influence and attributable to:
(a) a fault of management, under the same conditions as if the dominant
undertaking were a member of the management body of the dependent
company, or
(b) transactions effected or measures taken which are not in conformity
with the interests of the dependent company or failure to effect such
transactions or take such measures as would have been in conformity
with such interests.
2. (a) Each member of the administrative or management body of the dominant undertaking shall, together with it, bear joint and several unlimited
liability. A member may however be relieved of liability if he proves
that the influence giving rise to the damage is not attributable to him.
(b) Where members of the management body of the dependent company
are also liable, they shall bear joint and several liability with the
undertaking and the persons liable pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2(a).
Article 8
1. Where a company is dominated within the meaning of Article 2 or 3 of this
Directive, its management body shall prepare each year a special report
indicating exclusively whether:
(a) the company has in the preceding financial year concluded any agreement on a scale significant to it with
- the dominant undertaking,
- a third party dominated by the dominant undertaking,
- a third party on the initiative or in the interest of the dominant
undertaking,
- a third party on the initiative or in the interests of another person
dominated by the dominant undertaking.
(b) the company has in the preceding financial year taken or failed to take
significant measures
- on the initiative of the dominant undertaking,
- on the initiative of a third party dominated by the dominant undertaking,
- in the interests of the dominant undertaking,
- in the interests of a third party dominated by the dominant undertaking,
(c) any such agreements or measures or any failures to conclude such
agreements or take such measures are wholly or partly detrimental to
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the company. Detriment may in particular result from agreement on or
imposition of conditions which differ from those which independet
undertakings would have agreed between themselves. Where a number
of business transactions are consolidated in a single agreement which is
not customary in business relations between independent undertakings,
those transactions shall be dealt with separately for the purposes of the
information required to be given under subparagraphs (a) and (b).
Account shall not be taken of any benefits which might compensate for
the detriment suffered.
2. The person responsible for auditing the accounts of the company shall
examine the accuracy of the particulars contained in the report. The result
of the examination shall be recorded in a separate note in the report. Where
the auditor has established in carrying out the examination that the particulars given are incomplete, he shall state this fact in the note.
3. The report, together with the note, shall be made available to shareholders
from the date of publication or dispatch of the notice - convening the
general meeting at which the annual accounts and the appropriation of the
annual results are to be considered. It shall be published at the same time as
the annual accounts and in like manner.
Article 9
1. On application by a shareholder, or by a creditor of the company who is
unable to obtain satisfaction therefrom, or by the duly appointed employees'
representatives within the company, the court or authority competent under
national law may appoint one or more special auditors where the special
report provided for in Article 8 contains particulars as specified in paragraph 1(c) of that article or where facts are alleged which give rise to the
presumption that the company has, at the instigation of the dominant
undertaking or another person dominated by that undertaking, concluded
agreements or has taken or failed to take measures and that the interests of
the company have thereby suffered detriment.
2. Before appointing the special auditors, the court or authority shall invite the
management or supervisory body and the person responsible for auditing
the accounts of the company to appear and to express their observations.
3. The special auditor shall ascertain whether the company has suffered
detriment as a result of such agreements or measures or its failure to take
such measures and whether it appears that these may result from the
influence of the dominant undertaking or another person dominated by it.
He shall take account of benefits granted to the company that offset any
detriment and shall assess the latter in relation to them.
4. The special auditor shall be entitled to obtain all information and documents necessary to carry out his task both from the company and from the
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undertaking which dominates it and from other persons dominated by the
undertaking, and to carry out all necessary investigations.
5. The special auditor shall prepare a written report on the results of his
investigation. The management body of the company shall disclose a
summary of this report together with the conclusions contained therein in
the manner prescribed by the law of each Member State in accordance with
Article 3 of Directive 68/151/EEC.
6. The costs of the examination and any advance payments in respect of those
costs shall be borne by the company.
7. These provisions shall be without prejudice to national provisions governing
procedures for a special audit of the company prescribed for other purposes.
Article 10
1. On application by the persons referred to in Article 9(1), the court or
authority competent under national law may, after having ascertained that
the dominant undertaking has either directly or through another person
dominated by it influenced the management of the company, and has
thereby damaged the company, order one or more of the following measures, if it considers this necessary to protect the company, its shareholders
or employees:
(a) suspension from office of one or more members of the management or
supervisory body of the company or any other measure under national
law having the same effect;
(b) prohibition of further performance of damaging contracts and revocation of damaging measures without prejudice to the rights of third
parties acquired in good faith;
(c) imposition of a requirement that the dominant undertaking shall offer
to purchase the shares of shareholders of the company in the manner
and under the conditions laid down in Articles 15 and 17. The management body of the company shall disclose the offer in the manner
prescribed by the law of each Member State in accordance with Article
3 of Directive 68/151/EEC within one month from the date of receipt
of the report referred to in Article 17. It shall also state that the experts'
report referred to in Article 17 shall be sent free of charge to shareholders on request. Shareholders shall be entitled within one month
from the date of publication of the offer to request the court to examine
whether the offer is appropriate. Article 22(2) shall apply. Shareholders
shall be entitled within three months from the date of publication of the
offer to require acquisition of their shares. Article 23(2) shall apply.
3. Before ordering the measures provided for in paragraph 1, the court or
authority shall invite the members of the management or supervisory body

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol6/iss2/3

K. B6hlhoff J. Budde / Company groups - EEC Ninth Directive

of the company, the dominant undertaking and, where appropriate, the
special auditor to appear and to express their observations.
Article 11
1. Proceedings under Article 7(1) and (2) may be brought by the company or
by any shareholder acting on its behalf.
2. Proceedings may also be brought by any creditor of the company who is
unable to obtain satisfaction therefrom, without prejudice to the provisions
governing arrangements, compositions, bankruptcy, winding-up and similar
proceedings.
3. The period within which proceedings may be brought shall be not less than
three years from the date of the act causing the damage or, where this has
been concealed, from the date of its discovery.
Article 12
Articles 7 to 11 shall not apply where the dominant undertaking is entitled
to manage the company pursuant to Articles 24 or 35. The same shall apply in
the context of a set of rules introduced under Article 38.
Article 13
A company may, by written contract, submit to management by another
undertaking. This undertaking is hereafter called the other party to the
contract.
Article 14
1. The contract shall offer every outside shareholder of the company the
choice between
(a) the acquisition of his shares as provided for in Article 15, or
(b) the annual equalization payment as provided for in Article 16.
2. Outside shareholder means any shareholder of the company with the
exception of the other party to the contract and the following undertakings:
(a) any undertaking dominating the other party to the contract;
(b) any third undertaking linked with the other party to the contract by
reason of a control contract or unilateral declaration within the meaning
of Article 33;
(c) any undertaking belonging to the same group as the other party to the
contract within the meaning of Article 38;
(d) any third undertaking which is wholly owned by the other party to the
contract;
where such undertakings hold shares in the company.
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Article 15
1. The other party to the contract shall offer to acquire for cash the shares of
every outside shareholder of the company.
2. However, where the other party to the contract is also a company and is not
dependent on another undertaking, it may offer, instead of cash, either to
acquire the shares of outside sfiareholders in exchange for shares or convertible or ordinary debentures of that company, or the choice between cash
and such an exchange.
3. Where the other party to the contract is a public limited liability company
which has not been formed under the law of a Member State or of the
European Economic Community and is not dependent on another undertaking, it may offer the outside shareholders the choice between cash and an
exchange of their shares for shares or convertible or ordinary debentures of
that company.
4. Where the other party to the contract is a dependent undertaking. it may
likewise make an offer to outside shareholders in accordance with paragraph 2 relating to shares or convertible or ordinary debentures of its
dominant company, provided that such company is not dependent on
another undertaking.
5. Where the other party to the contract is an undertaking dominated by a
public limited liability company which has not been formed under the law
of a Member State or of the European Economic Community, it may
likewise make an offer to outside shareholders in accordance with paragraph 3 relating to shares or convertible or ordinary debentures of the
company dominating it, provided that the company is not dependent on
another undertaking.
Article 16
1. The other party to the contract shall also offer the outside shareholders of
the company an appropriate annual equalization payment. To this end it
shall undertake to make them an annual payment of an a[Amount equal at
least to that which, having regard to the previous earnings and the future
prospects of the company, could probably be distributed as the average
earnings per share.
2. Where the other party to the contract is also a company and is not
dependent on another undertaking, it may offer the outside shareholders,
instead of the annual payment referred to in paragraph 1, either an annual
payment of an amount corresponding to the earnings of its own shares or
the choice between the two payments.
3. Where the other party to the contract is an independent limited liability
company not formed under the law of a Member State or of the European
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Economic Community, it may also offer the outside shareholders the choice
between the annual payment referred to in paragraph 1 and that referred to
in paragraph 2.
Where the other party to the contract is a dependent undertaking it may
offer the outside shareholders, instead of the annual payment referred to in
paragraph 1, an annual amount calculated by reference to the earnings per
share of the company dominating it, provided that such company is not
dependent on another undertaking.
Where the other party to the contract is dominated by an independent
public limited liability companyof a merger not formed under the law of a
Member State or of the European Economic Community, it may offer to the
outside shareholders the choice between the annual payment referred to in
paragraph 1 and that referred to in paragraph 4.
The ratio between the shares of the companies concerned shall, in the cases
referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5, be calculated in the same way as for a share
exchange in the event of a merger.
In calculating the earnings pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 5, appropriations of
the annual profits to optional reserves shall be taken into consideration only
in so far as this is justified in accordance with sound business practice.

Article 17
1. The management body of the company shall appoint one or more independent experts and instruct them to prepare a report on the appropriateness of
the offers. The experts may be the persons responsible for auditing the
accounts of the company.
Articles 52 to 54, 57 and 62 of Directive see of See 2 shall apply in
respect of these experts.
2. In their report, the experts shall in particular state whether the offers of the
other party to the contract are in accordance with Articles 15 and 16 and
whether or not, in their opinion, they are appropriate. Such statement shall
at least:
(a) indicate the method or methods used to arrive at the payment offered
for acquisition of shares, share exchange ratio and equalization payment;
(b) state whether such method or methods are adequate in the case in
question, indicate the values arrived at using each such method and give
an opinion on the relative importance attributed to such methods in
arriving at the values decided on.
3. The report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties which have
arisen.
2

Proposal for a fifth Directive on the structure of soci~tds anonymes. Supplement 10/72 to the
Bulletin of the European Communities.
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4. Each expert shall be entitled to obtain from the companies concerned any
relevant information and documents, and to carry out all necessary investigations.
Article 22
1. Any outside shareholder may within one month of the publication of the
contract pursuant to Article 20. apply to the court for an examination of
whether the consideration offered for acquisition of the shares and the
annual equalization payment are appropriate. Where the other party to the
contract is also obliged to effect disclosure pursuant to Article 21, this
period shall commence on the date on which the second publication is
made.
2. The Member States shall determine the judicial procedure in accordance
with the following principles:
(a) the court may appoint independent experts at the expense of the
company; such experts shall be under the same obligations and enjoy
the same rights as experts appointed pursuant to Article 17;
(b) where the consideration for acquisition or the annual equalization
payment are held to be clearly inappropriate, they may be increased by
the court;
(c) the decision of the court shall be res judicata in respect of all shares of
the same class as those in respect of which a decision by the court was
applied for;
(d) in cases provided for the subparagraph (b), the decision of the court
shall be disclosed by the management body of the company in the
manner prescribed by the law of each Member State in accordance with
Article 3 of Directive 68/151/EEC after it has acquired the force of a
final judgment;
(e) the costs of proceedings must not be borne by the applicant except in so
far as is reasonable.
3. If an increased consideration for acquisition or annual equalization payment is ordered by the court, the other party to the contract may terminate
the contract without notice within one month from the date on which the
decision of the court has acquired the force of a final judgment.
Article 24
1. (a) From the time of publication pursuant to Article 20, the company shall
be subject to management by the other party to the contract. The latter
may issue instructions to the management body of the company and
such instructions shall be complied with by that body. Where the other
party to the contract is also subject to a requirement of disclosure
pursuant to Article 21, it may exercise management powers or issue
instructions only when the second publication has been effected.
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(b) Articles 15 to 17 of the second Directive 3 shall not apply to transactions of the company that must be effected by virtue of an instruction
pursuant to subparagraph (a).
2. If an instruction relates to a measure which requires the approval of the
supervisory body of the company and if the latter withholds its approval,
the requirement of approval shall cease upon repetition of the instruction.
This provision shall not apply when account has been taken of employees in
the composition of the supervisory board except if their interests are
safeguarded in an equivalent manner at the level of the other party to the
contract. If the other party to the contract is also a company and if account
has been taken in the composition of its supervisory board of the employees
of the company receiving the instructions, the instructions may be repeated
only with the approval of that supervisory board.
Article 25
The other party to the contract shall exercise its management powers and its
right to issue instructions pursuant to Article 24 with the care of a conscientious director and in the group interest.
Article 27
The members of the management body of the company shall not be liable
for damage that the company may sustain arising from acts or omissions by
them consequent on the exercise by the other party to the contract of its
management powers and its right to issue instructions. They shall bear the
burden of proof thereof.
Article 29
1. The other party to the contract shall be liable for any obligations of the
company arising prior to the conclusion of the contract or during the
contractual period. Nevertheless, proceedings may be brought against it
only after the creditor has addressed a written demand to the company.
2. The other party to the contract may, however, be relieved of such liability if
it proves that failure by the company to fulfill the obligation is attributable
to reasons which are not the result of any influence it has or has failed to
exercise.
3. The guarantee arising from the liability provided for in paragraph 1 may be
invoked from the date of publication pursuant to Article 20 or, where the
other party to the contract is also required to effect disclosure pursuant to
Article 21, from the date of the second publication.
3 Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976, OJ No. L 26 of 31.1.1977, p. 1.
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Article 30
1. The company shall upon expiry of the contract be entitled to require the
other party thereto to make good any diminution in the value that the
company has sustained during the contractual period. When determining
the diminution, the company's capital together with reserves, the profit or
loss and the profit or loss carried forward at the date of publication
pursuant to Article 20 and such amounts at the end of contractual period
shall be taken into consideration.
2. The other party to the contract may, however, be relieved of this obligation
if it proves that the diminution in the company's value during the contractual period was not the result of any influence it has or has failed to exercise.
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pre-draft was made public. The authors, like several organizations which have published comments, have had access to the unofficially released version which is reproduced in the appendix.
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112] E. Gessler. Das neue Aktienrecht. 1965 Der Betriebs-Berater at 677, 681.
[13] Cf. H. WOrdinger, in Grosskommentar zum Aktiengesez. introduction to AktG sections
15-19 (1973).
[14] See. e.g., EEC Enterprises Compared with Their Competitors. Survey by UNICE
[1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MARKET REPORTER (CCH) [9029 (February. 1965).
[15] Government draft of the 1965 Act, document no. IV/171. at 94 [hereinafter referred to as
"Government draft"]: see also V. Eckardt. in E. Gessler and W. Hefermehl et al., Aktiengesetz.
introduction n. 29 (1973).
[161 The term "enterprise". which is used but not defined in German statutes, is a generic term
which encompasses both incorporated and unincorporated business and includes foreign as well as
domestic entities.
[17] AktG section 20(l).
[18] Id. at section 20(4).
[19] Id. at section 20(5).
[20] Id. at section 20(6).
[21] Id. at section 20(7).
[22] See Government draft. supra note 15.
[23] This procedure was inspired by foreign. in particular American, models. The official
explanation of the Government draft refers to U.S. securities laws as well as to English, Canadian,
and Swedish legislation. See Government draft, supra note 15.
[24] AktG section 329(2). Specific rules apply if the enterprise heading the group is not a
corporation, cf. AktG section 330. or if German corporations are controlled by a foreign entity. cf.
AktG section 330(2).
[25] AktG sections 15-19, 291, and 292.
[26] Id. at section 17.
[271 AktG section 18 (1).
[281 Id.
[29] Id. at section 18(2).
[30] Id. at section 291.
[311 Id. at section 292.
[32] Id. at section 293(3).
[33] Id. at section 293(1).
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capital. (Greece was not a Member State when the most recent draft proposal was released.)
[106] Article 2.1 of the draft proposal. The definitions of dependence contained in Article 2 of
the draft proposal are equivalent to sections 16(4) and 17 of the AktG.
[107] See UNICE 1981 Comment, supra note 99, items B 5 through 9.
[108] See UNICE 1981 Comment, supra note 99, item B 10; BDI Comment, supra note 97, to
Article 7 of Part II of the 1974-75 pre-draft proposal.
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two-tier board system may still be required by the German co-determination laws.t
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